Politicians fashionably argue in favour of financial development to promote economic growth following the seminal study of Levine (1993a, 1993b). Financial development, however, could come through alternative channels that are sometimes not compatible in small open economics. A relatively popular channel promotes privatisation of domestic financial intermediaries but with restrictions on foreign ownership. The other competing channel works through foreign direct investment (FDI) requiring foreign ownership of national assets. Until the last decade of globalisation, from sixties through early nineties, in many APEC countries and especially in the East Asia, privatisation of national banks went hand in hand with a regime of financial repressions. Under that regime governments kept the domestic interest rate above the world rate by imposing barriers against FDI. Recent trend in globalisation creates a political tension between those who welcome and the others who oppose FDI. This paper evaluates the relative contribution of those two alternative channels of financial development to economic growth. The model of analysis builds on King and Levine (1993b) but restricts its attention to small open economies of the APEC. Contrary to the previous findings, privatisation of domestic financial sector alone turns out to have a negative impact on the growth of efficiency measured by the growth of total factor productivity. This discrepancy could possibly be rationalised by a special characteristic of the APEC sample where a negative effect on efficiency came from the regimes of financial repression that blocked FDI. Financial integration led by FDI does bring the prospect of lower economic growth due to increased business fluctuations especially for the small open economies. Nevertheless, it is surprising to find that a significant improvement in efficiency and growth came to the APEC nations through the international channel with the flow of FDI. Consequently, barriers to globalisation out of a purely the nationalist concerns may be ill fated even for small open economies.
Introduction
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) often takes the form of a one-way flow of capital and technology from a group of rich countries to the developing world. Conflicts of interests that stem from that unidirectional flow give rise to politically charged debates. The APEC experience, on the other hand, is an interesting case of distinction.
The eighteen members of the APEC account for more than fifty percent of the world's output. The USA and Japan, the two main sources of FDI in the world and China, one of the world's largest recipients of the FDI, are also members of a single entity, the APEC. FDI flows both ways among most of the other fifteen members, which are small open economies. Urata (2003) reports that the multidirectional flow of FDI has been an integrating force in the APEC promoting efficiency among its members. It brings financial resources for fixed investment that facilitates technology diffusion. It also offers alternative sources of finance to indigenous entrepreneurs who are otherwise constrained by the volume of capital that the domestic financial intermediaries can mobilise within their respective countries.
The emergence of the APEC coincides with a change in the global political atmosphere that has favoured structural changes also in the domestic financial institutions of the member countries. Those changes have been mostly complementary to a regional financial integration and hence suitable for attracting FDI. However, Urata (2003) notes that those changes have not been uniform and significant impediments to FDI exist even within the APEC. In a study about FDI in the South-East Asia, Ritchie (2002) reports that despite trade and financial liberalisations the countries have only limited success in leveraging foreign technology to foster economic growth.
The origin of such opposition to FDI can be traced to international politics. The strong national bias in some of the big sources of FDI induced by the influential members of the APEC such as the US and Japan generate cynicism among the opponents of FDI. They argue that the philosophy of liberalisation misses the important issue of national interests. For example, Bora and Graham (1997) note that "some individuals feel a sense of national loss when foreigners acquire existing domestic companies." Others raise concerns for undue increase in macroeconomic volatility in small open economies from a global financial integration. In a study conducted by the IMF, Prasad, et al, (2003) warn us about such possibility.
The FDI, however, supplies relatively less volatile and potentially plentiful source of capital. Noorbakhsh, Paloni and Youssef (2001) note that FDI serves to balance loan and equity capital in private investment without the heavy drag of debt service. This serves a nation especially well following a debt crisis.
Nevertheless, cynicism against political manipulations by the big players and concerns for macroeconomic fluctuations, adverse effects of changes in domestic institution on political stability, negative impacts on indigenous culture and environment have contributed to large fluctuations in FDI in the APEC. In particular, the FDI inflows to the developing East Asian members of the APEC show (see Table 1 below) a sharp increase from about $70 billion in 1995 to more than $90 billion in 1997, a sharp decrease in 1998 to $82 billion, followed by a resurgence in the next two years but a sharp decline again in 2001. Petri (1997) implies that barriers in the area of services that include financial services, in particular, are about three times higher than manufacturing and three to five times higher than primary in the East Asian countries. Clearly, the flow FDI faces a significant resistance when it comes to offering financial services.
The opponents of FDI led financial integration argue that growth could be achieved as well with a better financial system at home following an influential finding by King and Levine (1993a) : "Better financial systems stimulate economic growth." However, King and Levine (1993a) 's result hold in a closed economy model. Consequently, the conclusion applies to the health of the global financial system as opposed to that of a country. It may be unwise, therefore, to control the flow of international credits that FDI brings into small open economies.
A political tension does exist, however, in the absence of a clear assessment of the contribution of the FDI that facilitates a regional financial integration relative to that of the liberalised national financial institutions when it comes to economic growth in a small open economy. The current political debate in the APEC regarding the potential contribution of FDI in small open economies of the East Asia would, therefore, benefit from such a study.
This paper does just that. In particular, based on the theoretical framework modelled in Levine (1993a and 1993b) , it examines empirically the contribution of FDI led financial integration relative to contribution of the privatised domestic financial institutions to economic growth in small open economies of the APEC.
King and Levine use four special indicators to measure financial development. This paper identifies one of those indicators, the degree of privatisation of the domestic financial intermediaries, to most closely reflect the development of the domestic financial sector. It uses a combination of the remaining three indicators to measure how easily the private sector can access the international credit market as a result of FDI. It then compares the relative contribution of the two parallel sources of financial development to economic growth. The findings from this comparative study offer significant evidence and important insights that are quite relevant for assessing the potential contribution of FDI in other small open economies of the developing world.
Following the introduction there is a brief review of the background literature. A discussion on the key variables, the methodology of the empirical analysis and data sources follows afterwards. The main findings and concluding remarks are summarised before the complete list of references. Appendix A contains a summary of findings from several regressions. Appendix B includes the complete data set and formulas for constructing variables used in this paper.
Theoretical Background
Recently theoretical models have linked financial development to long run economic growth not only through its positive effect on capital mobilisation but also through its beneficial effect on the total factor productivity in the economy. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) emphasize the benefit of economies of scale in the processing of information on the marginal efficiency of investment that the financial intermediaries bring in as they develop over time. Bencivenga and Smith (1991) highlight the role of diversification of liquidity risk. Financial intermediaries pooled savings together to keep the level of liquid assets that investors prefer to leave to meet their unforeseeable liquidity risk to a minimum possible level. Consequently, it is possible to allocate a higher proportion of funds to finance innovative projects and this raises the total factor productivity or overall efficiency in the economy. Saint Paul (1992) emphasizes the role of the financial intermediaries in diversifying the risks of investment through technological and financial diversification. In the model a financial sector reduces the risk of specialized investment and, hence, increases the expected return from it, encouraging a higher rate of saving and investment in fully specialized capital that raises productivity in the economy. Pagano (1993) concludes that a greater efficiency of the financial intermediaries implies that a higher proportion of available savings in the economy would be channelled to augment the economy's capital stock. King and Levine (1993b) argue that a more efficient financial intermediary sector channels a larger fraction of saving to finance a greater number of innovative projects. This increases the technological advancement rate and the growth rate of final goods.
The common experience in APEC includes increased privatisation of banks and insurance companies due to a lower government share in the total assets of the domestic financial intermediaries as well as increased internationalisation of the credit market due to FDI.
Interestingly, most of the member countries in the East Asia allow the privatisation process to go hand in hand with a regime of financial repression. McKinnon (1973) provides a good reference for the idea of financial repression. This regime refers to a system of government policies designed to protect the profit of domestic financial institutions against international competition even when they allow competition among the local financial institutions. These policies effectively hold the domestic interest rate above the international market rate. The interest markup may help mobilize capital within the economy but would hinder the flow of FDI and technology diffusion, according to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) , by limiting the number of innovators within the economy. Consequently, it is not clear from the abstract theoretical perspective alone how growth has come to the APEC. We would need to design a model for empirical analysis to determine the importance of FDI relative to other competitive channels in transmitting growth to this region.
The Model
The model of analysis for this study follows the general framework of Levine (1993a, 1993b) . It, however, links national economic growth to two distinct channels of financial development. The twin channels refer to the domestic (or national) financial intermediaries versus global financial systems.
First, greater efficiency in the national financial system due to privatisation allows innovators to have more capital given the amount that a nation saves. The regime of financial repression that keeps the domestic interest rate at an artificially high level also boosts national saving. In the macroeconomic equilibrium, investment equals national saving plus capital inflow from abroad.
Let INV denote the ratio of investment to GDP, FI denote a financial development indicator and Z denote a vector of indicators of other aspects of economic development. Then, it follows from the above discussion that
For a given capital-output ratio Ω , which also depends on the financial and other indicators of development, the growth rate GK of capital per capita directly varies with the difference between the investment rate INV and the sum of the population growth rate n and the depreciation rate DEP of capital such that
Secondly, FDI facilitates a greater access to the international credit market and that helps the entrepreneurs to finance projects efficiently. Also, the opportunity to borrow at a low interest rate from abroad raises the relative proportion of innovators 2 and hence the growth rate GTFP of total factor productivity 3 in the economy. Consequently,
Along its transition path to steady state, the growth rate of per capita output GYP is a function of GK and GTFP as follows:
where the parameter α measures the output elasticity of output with respect to capital in a CobbDouglas production technology.
The key independent variable for the empirical exercise consist of one of the four financial indicators (FI) that King and Levine (1993b) On average countries enjoys a high level of development. Also, the distribution has a slight upward bias, since the mean exceeds the median for all variables except BANK. Nevertheless, there is a wide variation in the data and, in particular, the variance is significantly large compared to the mean for each variable, indicating suitability of the data for conducting a successful empirical analysis. Table 3 below reports how the four financial indicators are correlated. Note that BANK is negatively correlated to both the growth rate of per capita income (GYP) and the growth rate of total factor productivity (GTFP). The regime of financial repression that protects the domestic sector from the foreign competition may be responsible for offsetting the positive effects of the privatisation process for generating such significantly negative correlations.
Another contributing factor could be inflation that typically follows privatisation.
The privatisation process may indirectly push the government increasingly to rely on seignorage or inflation tax that typically retards economic growth. We note from Table 5 that the variable GL that denotes the amount of loans channelled to government as a percentage to GDP actually decreases as BANK increases. The values in parentheses below estimated coefficients are standard errors. *Indicates significance at 99% confidence interval. Table 6 offers further evidence that a higher value of BANK also accompanies a higher ratio of currency to GDP, which leads to inflation that negatively affects productivity growth. The values in parentheses below estimated coefficients are standard errors. *Indicates significance at 99% confidence interval.
To isolate the contribution of BANK and FDI, therefore, one needs to perform appropriate regressions only after controlling for various macroeconomic factors that may indirectly lead to possible correlations. Following King and Levine (1993b) 
Empirical Methodology and Data
The growth theoretical framework of King and Levine as described above serves as a guiding principle for organising the relevant data and the empirical experiment for this study. Let Y denote the set of growth performance indicators {INV, GK, GTFP, GYP}, which are the dependent variables. Let X denote the set of financial development indicators {BANK, PRIVY, LLY, PRIVATE}, from which a unique independent variable is chosen. Let i=1,2,…,N denote index for countries and t=1, 2, ..,T denote index for time intervals. The specific restrictions on the data, following King and Levine (1993b) is given by
where, it u describes an i.i.d. error that is normally distributed with zero mean and a finite variance. All variables for study turn out to be integrated of order zero or stationary.
Consequently, the causality implied by the estimated coefficients would be meaningful.
Note that, by (1), (2) and (4) The issue arises that a division of data into 3 time periods could bias the estimated coefficients of the equation (5) that exclude time specific effects. A full panel data study would be ideal to identify those effects. Unfortunately, the small sample size implies that the degrees of freedom would be too small to perform a meaningful panel data exercise. However, a modification of equation (5) that allows for a time effect λ can be used to get unbiased estimates of the coefficients as follows:
Some manipulations of equation (6) ,
In Appendix A, Tables 7 to 9 present results from regressions using equations (5) and (7).
Main Findings
Tables 7a and 7b compare the relative contribution of all four financial development indicators to economic growth report that BANK, the indicator of financial development through domestic channel, stands out to be unique in its negative impact on the growth rate of per capita output. To discern this negative impact on economic growth in more details let us focus on the results presented in Tables 8a and 8b . The first columns of Table 8a and 8b contain the same information as the second columns of 7a and 7b. The information presented in Tables 8a and 8b show that BANK have a significant negative effect on the growth rate of per capita output GYP and the growth rate of TFP (or efficiency) GTFP. It does have a weak but positive effect on the investment rate INV and on the growth rate of capital GK. These findings isolate BANK as the incorrect indicator for growth promoting financial development in the APEC. These results, therefore, stand in sharp contrast with the findings of King and Levine (1993b) . Tables 9a-9b show that PRIVY has a significant positive effect on four growth indicators in the APEC countries. The effect is transmitted through three channels. They are a higher real per capita physical capital growth rate, improved efficiency in other production factors and a higher investment rate. In other words, unlike the privatisation at home that has only mobilised capital but has not increased efficiency or per capita output growth rates, the flow of FDI from abroad has contributed to economic growth in the APEC through all three channels.
Empirical findings presented in
Theoretical models suggest that financial development can take two forms, improvement in efficiency and increase in size. The findings reported above suggest that the privatisation of domestic financial intermediaries indicated by BANK possibly measures only the latter. On the other hand, PRIVY, the proxy for FDI, induces both a greater volume of financial services as well as a better efficiency of allocation.
Concluding Remarks
The regression results presented at the end of this paper highlight that the contribution of financial development to growth in the APEC economies has come mainly from a greater access to the global financial system via FDI that presumably has reduced the interest rate gap without reducing the volume of available capital in the economy. Those results also highlight that the greater privatisation of domestic assets has only led to a higher rate of saving and a higher rate of accumulation of capital while the flow of FDI into the APEC contributed to the increase in the overall efficiency and the resulting growth in the total factor productivity. In addition, the empirical evidence, presented in this paper, indicate that the growth of national financial institutions under the regime of financial repression has lowered TFP growth. In other words, financial repressions and barriers to FDI inflows into financial services for the protection of the interests of the domestic financial intermediaries would be a bad economic policy to follow in small open economies. Such a policy may mobilise capital but would impede productivity growth.
Thus the study of the APEC reveals that the concern of nationalist governments against financial integration led by FDI to be ill founded. Such policies would likely lower the efficiency of resource allocation and hinder growth. Unfortunately, however, East Asian members of APEC maintain significant entry barriers to foreign providers of financial services. Consequently, the credit ratings of the domestic banks in those countries depend to a large extent on the quality of the expected support from the State rather than on the quality of banks' balance sheets and profitability. This paper suggests that a key to economic growth for these East Asian countries is the appropriate usage of FDI for efficient allocation of resources facilitated by a freer access to the international credit market.
APPENDIX A
Note: "a" refers to regressions using equation (5) that omits time specific effects and "b" refers to regressions using equation (7) that allows for time specific effects. Standard errors are in parentheses below estimated coefficients; *indicates coefficient is statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence interval; ** indicates coefficient is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence interval; *** indicates coefficient is statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence interval. Table 8b : Equation ( Note: Standard errors are in parentheses below estimated coefficients; *indicates coefficient is statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence interval; ** indicates coefficient is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence interval; *** indicates coefficient is statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence interval. PRIVATE is calculated by dividing IFS line 32d by the sum of IFS line32a to 32d and 32f and ten-year averages are used to construct data points. There is no information on PRIVATE for Hong Kong and Indonesia.
APPENDIX B
PRIVY is calculated by dividing IFS line 32d by GDP. Ten-year averages are used as data points. There is not enough information to construct PRIVY for Hong Kong and Indonesia.
Information on the five country specific control factors come from the World Data.
TRADE is the calculated by dividing the total value of exports and imports by GDP and ten-year average is used to construct data points.
